Klevius: Measured by Human Rights standard religion is protected racism/sexism
In Peter Klevius book Demand for Resources (1992:43, ISBN 9173288411) it is pointed out that jurisprudence is the only truly true science because it possesses absolute truth, i.e. the intention of the legislator. However, if only the U.S. Supreme Court had followed in the foot steps of John Locke, the philosophical father of the Constitution, this stupid decision would never have gone through.
John Locke (1632 – 1704) conceptualized rights as "natural" (i.e. axiomatic) and inalienable. Everyone is entitled to do anything they want to so long as it doesn't conflict with the rights of others. This is the meaning of the concept 'negative Human Rights', which constitutes the basis for U.N.'s anti-fascist Universal Human Rights declaration of 1948. This is also why every form of Jewish ("monotheist") religions is more or less racist/sexist and therefore understandably reluctant to fully accept Human Rights - because that would inevitably choke their "religious space".
Eating and keeping the cake
CNN: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Colorado baker who refused to bake a cake to celebrate the marriage of a same sex couple because of a religious objection.
The court held that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission showed hostility toward the baker based on his religious beliefs. The ruling is a win for baker Jack Phillips, who cited his beliefs as a Christian, but leaves unsettled broader constitutional questions on religious liberty.
"Today's decision is remarkably narrow, and leaves for another day virtually all of the major constitutional questions that this case presented," said Steve Vladeck, CNN Supreme Court analyst and professor at the University of Texas School of Law. "It's hard to see the decision setting a precedent."
The ruling, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission showed animus toward Phillips specifically when they suggested his claims of religious freedom was made to justify discrimination.
The case was one of the most anticipated rulings of the term and was considered by some as a follow up from the court's decision three years ago to clear the way for same-sex marriage nationwide. That opinion, also written by Kennedy, expressed respect for those with religious objections to gay marriage.
"Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth," he wrote Monday.
Alliance Defending Freedom Senior Counsel Kristen Waggoner, who represented Phillips, praised the ruling.
"Jack serves all customers; he simply declines to express messages or celebrate events that violate his deeply held beliefs," Waggoner said in a statement. "Creative professionals who serve all people should be free to create art consistent with their convictions without the threat of government punishment."
Louise Melling, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, emphasized the narrowness of the opinion.
"The court reversed the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision based on concerns unique to the case but reaffirmed its longstanding rule that states can prevent the harms of discrimination in the marketplace, including against LGBT people," Melling said in a statement.
Because Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part, the judgment of the court on the case was 7-2 but the opinion on the rationale was 6-2.
Kennedy wrote that there is room for religious tolerance, pointing specifically to how the Colorado commission treated Phillips by downplaying his religious liberty concerns.
"At the same time the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression," Kennedy wrote, adding that the "neutral consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here."
"The commission's hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment's guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion," Kennedy said, adding to say that the case was narrow.
"The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market," the opinion states.
Phillips opened the bakery in 1993, knowing at the outset that there would be certain cakes he would decline to make in order to abide by his religious beliefs.
"I didn't want to use my artistic talents to create something that went against my Christian faith," he said in an interview with CNN last year, noting that he has also declined to make cakes to celebrate Halloween.
In 2012, David Mullins and Charlie Craig asked Phillips to bake a cake to celebrate their planned wedding, which would be performed in another state. Phillips said he couldn't create the product they were looking for without violating his faith.
"The Bible says, 'In the beginning there was male and female,'" Phillips said.
He offered to make any other baked goods for the men. "At which point they both stormed out and left," he said.
Mullins and Craig filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which ruled in their favor, citing a state anti-discrimination law. Phillips took his case to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing that requiring him to provide a wedding cake for the couple violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. The court held that the state anti-discrimination law was neutral and generally applicable and did not compel Phillips' Masterpiece Cakeshop to "support or endorse any particular religious view." It simply prohibited Phillips from discriminating against potential customers on account of their sexual orientation.
"This case is about more than us, and it's not about cakes," Mullins said in an interview last year. "It's about the right of gay people to receive equal service."
The Trump administration sided with Phillips.
"A custom wedding cake is not an ordinary baked good; its function is more communicative and artistic than utilitarian," Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued. "Accordingly, the government may not enact content-based laws commanding a speaker to engage in protected expression: An artist cannot be forced to paint, a musician cannot be forced to play, and a poet cannot be forced to write."
Klevius has previously criticized Ruth Bader Ginsburg for her confusion re. the crucial sex/gender distinction (see below). However, in this case she shares Klevius view. In her dissent which was joined by Sonia Sotomayor, she argued that "when a couple contacts a bakery for a wedding cake, the product they are seeking is a cake celebrating their wedding -- not a cake celebrating heterosexual weddings or same-sex weddings -- and that is the service (the couple) were denied."
Klevius wrote five years ago:
Thursday, March 14, 2013
Klevius sex and gender tutorial
Klevius quest of the day: What's the difference between the Pope and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg?
Klevius hint: It's all about 'not sameness' and Human Rights! Human Rights IS 'sameness' stupid!
When God was created he was made like Adam.
When the basic idea of Universal Human Rights was created it was made like Adam AND Eve.
And for you who think heterosexual attraction, i.e. that women are sexier than men, could be (exc)used as a reason for depriving women of legal sameness. Please, do think again!And read Klevius Sex and Gender Tutorial below - if you can!
The Plan of God
A Cardinal, a Pope and a Justice "from medieval times"
Keith O'Brien has reiterated the Catholic Church's continued opposition to civil partnerships and suggested that there should be no laws that "facilitate" same-sex relationships, which he claimed were "harmful", arguing that “The empirical evidence is clear, same-sex relationships are demonstrably harmful to the medical, emotional and spiritual wellbeing of those involved, no compassionate society should ever enact legislation to facilitate or promote such relationships, we have failed those who struggle with same-sex attraction and wider society by our actions.”
Four male members of the Scottish Catholic clergy allegedly claim that Keith O'Brien had abused his position as a member of the church hierarchy by making unwanted homosexual advances towards them in the 1980s.
Keith O'Brien criticized the concept of same-sex marriage saying it would shame the United Kingdom and that promoting such things would degenerate society further.
Pope Francis, aka Jorge Bergoglio: Same-sex is a destructive pretension against the plan of God. We are not talking about a mere bill, but rather a machination of the Father of Lies that seeks to confuse and deceive the children of God." He has also insisted that adoption by gay and lesbian people is a form of discrimination against children. This position received a rebuke from Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who said the church's tone was reminiscent of "medieval times and the Inquisition".
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 'Sex' is a dirty word, so let's use 'gender' instead!
Klevius: Let's not!
As previously and repeatedly pointed out by Klevius, the treacherous use of 'gender' instead of 'sex' is not only confusing but deliberately so. So when Jewish Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg proposed gender' as a synonyme for 'sex' (meaning biological sex) she also helped to shut the door for many a young girl's/woman's possibilities to climb outside the gender cage.
The Universal Human Rights declaration clearly states that your biological sex should not be referred to as an excuse for limiting your rights.
Islam (now represented by OIC and its Sharia declaration) is the worst and most dangerous form of sex segregation - no matter in how modern clothing it's presented!
Klevius Sex and Gender Tutorial
What is 'gender' anyway?
(text randomly extracted from some scientific writings by Klevius)
It might be argued that it is the developing girl, not the grown up woman, who is the most receptive to new experience, but yet is also the most vulnerable. Therefore we need to address the analysis of the tyranny of gender before the point at where it's already too late. I prefer to use the term ‘female’ instead of ‘woman’ so to include girls, when appropriate in this discussion. I also prefer not to define women in relation to men, i.e. in line with the word 'universal' in the Human Rights Declaration. In short, I propose 'gender blindness' equally as, for example, 'color blindness'. And keep in mind, this has nothing to do with biological differences.
According to Connell (2003:184), it is an old and disreputable habit to define women mainly on the basis of their relation to men. Moreover, this approach may also constitute a possible cause of confusion when compared to a definition of ‘gender’ which emphasizes social relations on the basis of ‘reproductive differences’.
To really grasp the absurdity of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's and others habit of confusing 'gender' with 'sex' one may consider that “normal” girls/women live in the same gender trap tyranny as do transsexuals.
The definition of ‘acquired gender’ is described in a guidance for/about transsexuals as:
Transsexual people have the deep conviction that the gender to which they were assigned at birth on the basis of their physical anatomy (referred to as their “birth gender”) is incorrect. That conviction will often lead them to take steps to present themselves to the world in the opposite gender. Often, transsexual people will undergo hormonal or surgical treatment to bring their physical identity into line with their preferred gender identity.
This evokes the extinction of the feminine or women as directly dependent on the existence of the masculine or men. Whereas the feminine cannot be defined without the masculine, the same applies to women who cannot be defined - only described - without men.
Female footballers, for example - as opposed to feminine footballers, both male and female - are, just like the target group of feminism, by definition distinguished by sex. Although this classification is a physical segregation – most often based on a delivery room assessment made official and not at all taking into account physical size, strength, skills etc. - other aspects of sex difference, now usually called ‘gender’, seem to be layered on top of this dichotomy. This review departs from the understanding that there are two main categories that distinguish females, i.e. the physical sex belonging, for example, that only biological women may participate in a certain competition, and the cultural sex determination, for example that some sports or sporters are less ‘feminine’ than others.
‘Gender’ is synonymous with sex segregation, given that the example of participation on the ground of one’s biological sex is simply a rule for a certain agreed activity and hence not sex segregation in the form of stipulated or assumed separatism. Such sex segregation is still common even in societies which have prescribed to notions of general human freedom regardless of sex and in accordance with Human Rights. This is because of a common consensus that sex segregation is ‘good’ although, as it is seen here, its effects are bad in the long run.
In Durkheim’s (1984: 142) view ‘organized despotism’ is where the individual and the collective consciousness are almost the same. Then sui generis, a new life may be added on to that of the main body. As a consequence, this freer and more independent state progresses and consolidates itself (Durkheim 1984: 284).
However, consensus may also rest on an imbalance that is upheld and may even strengthen precisely as an effect of the initial imbalance. In such a case ‘organized despotism’ becomes the means for conservation. As a consequence, the only alternative would be to ease restrictions, which is something fundamentally different from proposing how people should live their lives. ‘Organized despotism’ in this meaning may apply to gender and to sex segregation as well.
According to Connell (2003) whose confused view may be closer to that of Justice Ginsburg, gender is neither biology, nor a fixed dichotomy, but it has a special relation to the human body mirrored in a ‘general perception’. Cultural patterns do not only mirror bodily differences. Gender is ‘a structure’ of social relations/practices concentrated to ‘the reproductive arena’, and a series of due practices in social processes. That is, gender describes how society relates to the human body, and has due consequences for our private life and for the future of wo/mankind (Connell 2003:21-22). However, the main problem here involves how to talk without gender.
Sex should properly refer to the biological aspects of male and female existence. Sex differences should therefore only be used to refer to physiology, anatomy, genetics, hormones and so forth. Gender should properly be used to refer to all the non‑biological aspects of differences between males and females ‑ clothes, interests, attitudes, behaviors and aptitudes, for example ‑ which separate 'masculine' from 'feminine' life styles (Delamont 1980: 5 in Hargreaves 1994:146).
It seems that 'masculine' and 'feminine’ in this definition of gender is confusingly close to the ‘mystique about their being predetermined by biology’ when compared to the ‘reproductive arena’ and ‘reproductive differences’ in Connell’s definition of gender. However, although gender, according to Connell (2003: 96), may also be ‘removed’ the crucial issue is whether those who are segregated really want to de-sex segregate? As long as the benefits of a breakout are not clearly assessable, the possible negative effects may undermine such efforts.Hesitating to run out through an opened door to the unknown doesn't necessarily mean that you don't want to. Nor does it mean that you have to.
According to Connell (2003:20) the very key to the understanding of gender is not to focus on differences, but, instead, to focus on relations. In fact, this distinction is crucial here because relations, contrary to differences, are mutually dependent. Whatever difference existing between the sexes is meaningless unless it is connected via a relation. On the one hand, big male muscles can hardly be of relational use other than in cases of domestic violence, and on the other hand, wage gaps cannot be identified without a comparative relation to the other sex.
Biological determinism is influential in the general discourse of sports academia (Hargreaves 1994:8). However, what remains to analyze is whether ‘gender’ is really a successful concept for dealing with biological determinism?
‘To explain the cultural at the level of the biological encourages the exaggeration and approval of analyses based on distinctions between men and women, and masks the complex relationship between the biological and the cultural’ (Hargreaves 1994:8).
With another example: to explain the cultural (driver) at the level of the technical (type of car) encourages the exaggeration and approval of analyses based on distinctions between cars, and masks the complex relationship between the car and the driver. However, also the contrary seems to hold true;. that the cultural (driver/gender) gets tied to the technical/biological. The ‘complex relationship’ between the car and the driver is easily avoided by using similar1 cars, hence making the driver more visible. In a sex/gender setting the ‘complex relationship’ between sex and gender is easily avoided by distinguishing between sex and culture2, hence making culture more visible. The term ‘culture’, unlike the term ‘gender’ clearly tries to avoid the ‘complex relationship’ between biology and gender. The ‘complex relationship’ makes it, in fact, impossible to distinguish between them. On top of this comes the ‘gender relation’ confusion, which determines people to have ‘gender relations’, i.e. to be opposite or separate.
This kind of gender view is popular, perhaps because it may serve as a convenient way out from directly confronting the biology/culture distinction, and seems to be the prevalent trend, to the extent that ‘gender’ has conceptually replaced ‘sex’, leading to the consequence that the latter has become more or less self-evident and thus almost beyond scrutiny. In other words, by using ‘gender’ as a sign for ‘the complex relationship between the biological and the cultural’, biological determinism becomes more difficult to access analytically.
The distinction between sex and gender implied in these quotations, however, does not seem to resolve the issue, precisely because it fails to offer a tool for discriminating biological aspects of differences from non-biological ones, i.e. those that are cultural. This is also reflected in everyday life. ‘Folk’ categories of sex and gender often appear to be used as if they were the same thing. Although 'masculine' and 'feminine' are social realities, there is a mystique about their being predetermined by biology. Furthermore the very relational meaning of ‘gender’ seems to constitute a too obvious hiding place for a brand of essentialism based on sex. Apart from being ‘structure’, as noted above, gender is, according to Connell (2003:20), all about relations. However, if there are none - or if the relations are excluding - the concept of sex segregation may be even more useful.
In Connell’s analysis, gender may be removed (Connell 2003:96). In this respect and as a consequence, gender equals sex segregation. In fact it seems that the 'masculine' and 'feminine’, in the definition of gender above, are confusingly close to the ‘mystique about their being predetermined by biology’ when compared to the ‘reproductive arena’ and ‘reproductive differences’ in Connell’s (2003:21) definition of gender. The elusiveness of gender seems to reveal a point of focus rather than a thorough-going conceptualization. So, for example, in traditional Engels/Marx thinking the family’s mediating formation between class and state excludes the politics of gender (Haraway 1991: 131).
What's a Woman?
In What is a Woman? Moi (1999) attacks the concept of gender while still emphasizing the importance of the concept of the feminine and a strong self-conscious (female) subject that combines the personal and the theoretical within it. Moi (1999: 76), hence, seems to propose a loose sex/gender axis resting on a rigid womanhood based on women’s context bound, lived experience outside the realm of men’s experience.
Although I share Moi’s suggestion for abandoning the category of gender, her analysis seems to contribute to a certain confusion and to an almost incalculable theoretical abstraction in the sex/gender distinction because it keeps maintaining sex segregation without offering a convincing defence for it. Although gender, for example, is seen as a nature-culture distinction, something that essentializes non-essential differences between women and men, the same may be said about Moi’s approach if we understand her ‘woman’ as, mainly, the mainstream biological one usually classified (prematurely) in the delivery room. If the sexes live in separate spheres, as Moi’s analysis seems to imply, the lived, contextual experience of women appears as less suitable for pioneering on men’s territory.
This raises the question about whether the opening up of new frontiers for females may demand the lessening or even the absence of femininity (and masculinity). In fact, it is believed here that the ‘liminal state’ where social progression might best occur, is precisely that. Gender as an educated ‘facticity’ then, from this point of view, will inevitably enter into a state of world view that adds itself onto the ‘lived body’ as a constraint.
It is assumed here that we commonly conflate constructs of sex, gender, and sexuality. When sex is defined as the ‘biological’ aspects of male and female, then this conceptualization is here understood as purely descriptive. When gender is said to include social practices organized in relation to biological sex (Connell 1987), and when gender refers to context/time-specific and changeable socially constructed relationships of social attributes and opportunities learned through socialization processes, between women and men, this is also here understood as descriptive. However, when description of gender transforms into active construction of gender, e.g. through secrets about its analytical gain, it subsequently transforms into a compulsory necessity. Gendering hence may blindfold gender-blind opportunities.
In conclusion, if gender is here understood as a social construct, then it is not coupled to sex but to context, and dependent on time. Also it is here understood that every person may possess not only one but a variety of genders. Even if we consider gender to be locked together with the life history of a single individual the above conceptualization makes a single, personal gender impossible, longitudinally as well as contemporaneously. Whereas gender is constructive and deterministic, sex is descriptive and non-deterministic. In this sense, gender as an analytical tool leaves little room for the Tomboy.
The Tomboy - a threat to "femininity"
Noncompliance with what is assumed ‘feminine’ threatens established or presumed sex segregation. What is perceived as ‘masculinity’ or ‘maleness’ in women, as a consequence, may only in second place, target homosexuality. In accordance with this line of thought, the Tomboy embodies both the threat and the possibilities for gendered respectively gender-blind opportunity structures.
The Tomboy is the loophole out of gender relations. Desires revealed through sport may have been with females under the guise of a different identity, such as that of the Tomboy (Kotarba & Held 2007: 163). Girls throw balls ‘like girls’ and do not tackle like boys because of a female perception of their bodies as objects of action (Young 2000:150 cited in Kotarba & Held 2007: 155).
However, when women lacking experience of how to act in an effective manner in sport are taught about how to do, they have no problem performing, quite contrary to explaining shortcomings as due to innate causes (Kotarba & Held 2007: 157). This is also opposite to the experiences of male-to-female transsexuals who through thorough exercise learn how to feminize their movements (Schrock & Boyd 2006:53-55). Although, according to Hargreaves (1994), most separatist sports philosophies have been a reaction to dominant ideas about the biological and psychological predispositions of men and women, supposedly rendering men 'naturally suited to sports, and women, by comparison, essentially less suited (Hargreaves 1994:29-30), the opposite may also hold true. Separatism per definition needs to separate and this separation is often based on biological differences, be it skin colour, sex or something else.
From this perspective, the Tomboy would constitute a theoretical anomaly in a feminine separatist setting. Although her physical body would possibly qualify as feminine, what makes her a Tomboy would not.
The observation that in mixed playgrounds, and in other areas of the school environment, boys monopolize the physical space (Hargreaves 1994:151) may lack the additional notion that certain boys dominate and certain boys do not. Sports feminists have 'politicized' these kinds of experience by drawing connections between ideas and practice (Hargreaves 1994:3) but because of a separatist approach may exclude similar experience among parts of the boys. Moreover, a separatist approach is never waterproof and may hence leak Tomboy girls without a notion.
Femininity and feminism
Feminism and psychoanalysis as oppressors
According to Collier and Yanagisako (1987), Henrietta Moore (1994) and other feminist anthropologists, patriarchal dominance is an inseparable socially inherited part of the conventional family system. This implicit suggestion of radical surgery does not, however, count on unwanted secondary effects neither on the problem with segregated or non-segregated sex-worlds. If, in other words, oppression is related to gender segregation rather than patriarchy, or perhaps that patriarchy is a product of sex segregation, then there seems to be a serious problem of intellectual survival facing feminists themselves (Klevius in Angels of Antichrist 1996). If feminism1 is to be understood as an approach and/or analytical tool for separatism2, those feminists and others who propose not only analytical segregation but also practical segregation, face the problem of possible oppression inherent in this very segregation (Klevius 1994, 1996). In this sense oppression is related to sex segregation in two ways:
1. As a means for naming it (feminism) for an analytical purpose.
2. As a social consequence or political strategy (e.g. negative bias against, for example, female football or a separatist strategy for female football).
It is notable that the psychoanalytic movement has not only been contemporary with feminism, but it has also followed (or led) the same pattern of concern and proposed warnings and corrections that has marked the history of ‘feminism’ in the 20th century. According to S. Freud, the essence of the analytic profession is feminine and the psychoanalyst ‘a woman in love’ (L. Appignanesi & J. Forrester 1992:189). But psychoanalytically speaking, formalized sex and sex segregation also seem to have been troublesome components in the lives of female psychoanalysts struggling under a variety of assumed, but irreconcilable femininities and professional expectations.
In studying the history of feminism one inevitable encounters what is called ‘the women’s movement’. While there is a variety of different feminisms, and because the borders between them, as well as to what is interpreted as the women’s rights movement, some historians, incl. Klevius, question the distinction and/or methods in use for this distinction.
However, it could also be argued that whereas the women’s rights movement may be distinguished by its lack of active separatism within the proposed objectives of the movement, feminism ought to be distinguished as a multifaceted separatist movement based on what is considered feminine values, i.e. what is implied by the very word ‘feminism’3. From this perspective the use of the term ‘feminism’ before the last decades of the 19th century has to be re-evaluated, as has every such usage that does not take into account the separatist nature underpinning all feminisms worth carrying the name. Here it is understood that the concept ‘feminism’, and its derivatives, in every usage implies a distinction based on separating the sexes - e.g. addressing inequality or inequity - between male and female (see discussion above). So although ’feminism’ and ‘feminisms’ would be meaningless without such a separation, the ‘women’s rights movement’, seen as based on a distinct aim for equality with men in certain legal respects, e.g. the right to vote, could be described as the opposite, i.e. de-sex segregation, ‘gender blindness’ etc.
As a consequence the use of the word feminism in a context where it seems inappropriate is here excepted when the authors referred to have decided to do so. The feminist movement went back to Mary Wollstonecraft and to some French revolutionaries of the end of the eighteenth century, but it had developed slowly. In the period 1880 to 1900, however, the struggle was taken up again with renewed vigour, even though most contemporaries viewed it as idealistic and hopeless. Nevertheless, it resulted in ideological discussions about the natural equality or non-equality of the sexes, and the psychology of women. (Ellenberger 1970: 291-292).
Not only feminist gynocentrists, but also anti-feminist misogynists contributed with their own pronouncements on the woman issue. In 1901, for example, the German psychiatrist Moebius published a treatise, On the Physiological Imbecility of Woman, according to which, woman is physically and mentally intermediate between the child and man (see Ellenberger 1970:292). However, according to the underlying presumption of this thesis, i.e. that the borders between gynocentrism and misogyny are not well understood, these two approaches are seen as more or less synonymous. Such a view also confirms with a multitude of points in common between psychoanalysis and feminism. As was argued earlier, the main quality of separatism and ‘complementarism’ is an insurmountable border, sometimes contained under the titles: love, desire etc.
Tuesday, July 22, 2014
Which one is weirder, Klevius (the main world critic of sex segregation/apartheid*) or sex apartheid?
* Admittedly Klevius seems also still to be the only one addressing the core issue of this monumental world problem. However, this fact is no more surprising than the fact that we live in a world where every girl has to assign herself to long hair, make up, "feminine" clothing etc cultural "femininity". And if she doesn't then she has to excuse herself by labeling herself a lesbian, a transexual etc or be labeled by others as "suffering" from the invented mental pathology of "gender dysphoria".
What is sex segregation - and what is it not?
According to soft brained Wikipedia: Sex segregation is the physical, legal, and cultural separation of people according to their biological sex. This is distinct from gender segregation, which is the separation of people according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female.
According to hard brained Klevius: Sex segregation is the physical, legal (e.g. Sharia), and cultural separation of girls/women from boys/men according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female.
Gender segregation is an impossible term in this context because the separation of people according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female resides inside the brain not outside the body and can therefore not be called segregation. Segregation is the action or state of setting someone apart from other people or being set apart. In other words, segregation can only be imposed on you from outside with or without your consent. You cannot segregate yourself. Moreover, segregation implies a collective, not individual, action.
According to Carmen Hamilton (apparently a soft brained lawyer): We’re born as either male or female and, generally, are raised to look and act as our society expects men and women to look and act (sic).
If a radical (sic) approach to eliminate gender segregation were adopted, we would see the complete eradication of gender segregation in all aspects of life. There would no longer be men’s and women’s washrooms, sports, or communal change rooms.
Still, a move to eradicate systemic gender segregation, would inevitably have fallout that would need to be addressed. There are legitimate safety concerns behind some gender segregation. Physical and sexual violence suffered by women at the hands of men continues to be a sad reality. It is difficult to see how women prisoners will be adequately protected if sex segregation is eliminated in prisons.
It also begs the question about whether we can eliminate sex segregation when we have not yet achieved gender equality (sic). Would such a movement nullify the gains fought for by feminists over the last century? There was a time when it was seen as a huge win for women in trades when employers were required to provide separate washrooms for women. Further, we cannot ignore the physiological differences between men and women that put women at a disadvantage in many sports. We would likely see far fewer female Olympians.
Klevius comment: 'We are generally raised to look and act as our society expects men and women to look and act' is a meaningless tautology because 'generally' and 'our society' both have the same meaning. Moreover, Carmen Hamilton seems to be deeply confused when she uses sex segregation and gender segregation as synonyms. What do your invisible gender thoughts in your brain have to do with physical threats from men? Isn't it your biological sex (or your signaling of a female body) that is visible, not your gender.
And why a 'radical elimination of segregation'? What's that anyway?! What would radical Human Rights mean? Would it mean that there exist some moderate Human Rights according to which just a little torture is ok?!
And why can't we have female prisons, washing rooms etc? It has nothing to do with sex segregation/apartheid. We have parking spots for disabled people but not for women. And why can't women continue running 100 m separate from men? We don't call other effects of physical sex differences sex segregation either. Carmen Hamilton seems to seriously mix apples and pears on this topic. She represents a dangerous view that blurs women's right to full Human Rights equality.
Carmen Hamilton also asks 'whether we can eliminate sex segregation when we have not yet achieved gender equality'. What a non sense! 'Gender equality' is an oxymoron in many sense but here mainly because sex segregation is the opposite to "gender equality"! In other words a catch 22.
LGBT people have "gender rights" but 11-year old football girls have none (see below).
Klevius' sex tutorial: The problem with main stream* feminism is its "equal but different" separatism* Folks, there are two main types of 'feminism' out there: One that is academic and based on segregation/separatism/apartheid (e.g. muslim feminism), and one that could be described as folk "feminism", i.e. the erroneous belief that feminism stands for equal rights when it in fact stands for separatism.
'Heterosexual attraction' is the only analytical concept you need - yet no one seems to use it as such except Klevius
The feminist fallacy of the double failure not to recognize heterosexual attraction while simultaneously keeping up sex segregation
Heterosexual attraction is the evolutionary logarithm that underpins heterosexual reproduction.
The only heterosexual human is a heterosexual man. If you don't understand/recognize this simple fact then you, just like feminists, have no say at all in discussions about Human Rights and the adverse effect of sex segregation.
Heterosexual attraction in humans resides in the male brain as the female body. Not the other way round. As a consequence only men can have heterosexual sex.
All men and women are different but equal according to Human Rights. However, according to feminists, only men and women are different from a rights perspective. So when Moi uses some 500 pages to tell us that only women, not men, can have women's experience, we can waive her next deep thought namely that women are different from other women.
Ever thought about why Mideast happened to be the birthplace of the most disgusting of cumber stones on humanity's road to Universal Human Rights (including women)? In Demand for Resources Klevius established the root origin of "general" sex segregation as connected to the transition from hunting/gathering to investment a la the neolithic revolution.
However, pure institutionalized sexism, i.e. sex segregation as apartheid, was born out of particular secondary circumstances and effects of sex segregation in the commerce between the new forms of production. The main birthplace for true sexism was Mideast due to its geographical location.You don't have sex religions in China, Japan etc.
When men traded and therefore travelled around, women became even more segregated than they were in the farming society where they at least had a daily contact over the sex barrier. Combine this development with slavery and defense against slavery and you end up with "the chosen people" whose survival was the institutionalized Vagina gate and whose (im)morality was sanctioned by "God".
Slowing down the process of de-sex segregation at an 'all deliberate speed' while treating sex segregation symptoms with hormones and surgery
'All deliberate speed' was a phrase used in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which declared the system of legal segregation unconstitutional. However, the Court ordered only that the states end segregation with ‘all deliberate speed', i.e. to weigh something in the balance.
Grace Kelly Bermudez is the plaintiff in a suit, which alleges Colombia’s military service requirement is discriminatory insofar as it only considers assigned sex — typically determined at birth by the presence of absence of external sex organs — and not gender identity – a 'lived internal and individual experience'.
While the military service requirement only applies to men, there is currently no statute governing cases of transsexuals who were assigned a restricting sex at birth and due to sex segregation weren't allowed to lead their lives as they wished.
Gender, as opposed to sex, is a “lived internal and individual experience,” according to an amicus brief filed on Bermudez’s behalf.
Trans persons’ ability to 'construct their gender in a determining fashion' is an implicit part of their “individual autonomy as human beings', an interpretation the Constitutional Court agreed with, argues the brief, when it ruled that all Colombians have the right to 'freely' define their 'association with any particular gender, as well as romantic orientation toward others.'
As a consequence it is argued that the current military exemption practice violates Bermudez’s 'right to gender identity and all related rights by denying her construction of identity, leading to the violation of her privacy, personhood, and right to live free of humiliations', reads the brief.
Klevius comment: So wrong! It is sex segregation that denies the construction of an identity that partly or fully falls outside this segregation, leading to the violation of privacy, personhood, and right to live free of humiliations etc. And sex segregation is already dismissed in the 1948 Human Rights declaration. Why not simply stick to Human Rights rather than upholding a ridiculous sex apartheid.
Jeff and Hillary Whittington presented a video showing little Ryland's female-to-male transition
Klevius comment: You can't possibly be born with a 'gender'. The popularity of LGBT rhetorics is largely due to the defense of sex segregation/apartheid. So ironically, LGBT people's fight for the freedom to lead their lives as they wish simultaneously restricts the playroom for non-LGBT girls and women. Again, Klevius simple answer is to empower girls'/women's Human Right to lead their lives without restrictions because of their sex. And if people don't stop bullying them then why not criminalize such bullying as a hate crime. That would in no time make people equally cautious as they are now about saying anything about muslims, wouldn't it.
John D. Inazu, associate professor of law at Washington University School of Law, an expert on the First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion: In less than three decades, the Supreme Court has moved from upholding the criminalizing of gay conduct to affirming gay marriage. The tone of the debates has also shifted. Views on gender and sexual conduct have flip-flopped. Thirty years ago, many people were concerned about gender equality, but few had LGBTQ equality on their radar. Today, if you ask your average 20-year-old whether it is worse for a fraternity to exclude women or for a Christian group to ask gay and lesbian members to refrain from sexual conduct, the responses would be overwhelmingly in one direction.
Luke Brinker (in Bill O'Reilly's Dangerous Parenting Advice For Transgender Kids): O'Reilly has also encouraged parents to actively force their transgender children to conform to gender stereotypes.
Klevius: So it's not a 'gender stereotype' when 'activities and clothing more commonly associated with boys' is enough to deem a girl on a path toward physiological manipulation of her body rather than give her the right to perform these activities without sex apartheid.
Jack Drescher, a member of the APA subcommittee working on the revision of DSM: 'All psychiatric diagnoses occur within a cultural context.
Klevius comment: So when DSM 15 is out, can the male to female trans get their penis back, please?
Homosexuality was diagnosed in the DSM as an illness until 1973, and conditions pertaining to homosexuality were not entirely removed until 1987.
The new term 'gender dysphoria' implies a temporary mental state rather than an all-encompassing disorder, a change that blurs the picture even more.
Shannon Minter, legal director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights: 'Having a diagnosis is extremely useful in legal advocacy. We rely on it even in employment discrimination cases to explain to courts that a person is not just making some superficial choice ... that this is a very deep-seated condition recognized by the medical community.'
Klevius comment: The only deep-seated condition in this appalling symptom of sex segregation is the medical community and money.
Mental health professionals who work with trans clients are also pushing for a revised list of symptoms, so that a diagnosis will not apply to people whose distress comes from external prejudice, adults who have transitioned, or children who simply do not meet gender stereotypes.
Why is the sex segregated bullying of girls like Moa Thambert supported when it should, in fact, be classified as a hate crime?!
Parents used to shout 'boy' at me, says now 16-year old Moa Thambert.
Moa Thambert, 16, has always had short hair cut and been tough on the football pitch.
Moa Thambert, 16: It took me hard to be called a boy. Is still in the back of my head. As a child I didn't understand why they wanted to segregate me. But now I understand that it was because I dare to take my place and that I have a certain appearance. It makes me really sad.
When Moa was six she begun playing football and immediately got comments about her "inappropriate" sex appearance. 'It's so sick because there is no difference in how kids look like. One should really be careful not to do so. It strikes very hard.It shouldn't need to be like that.
Pia Sundhage (Sweden's football lady number one and former US coach): It's appalling. In the 1960s I had to pretend to be a boy to be allowed playing in a football team.
Pia Sundhage refers to a recent Swedish football tournament (Fotbollsfesten) for kids where 11-year old girls in Glumslövs FF/Lunds BK were accused of being boys by leaders and parents from Åhus IF.
Åhus IF coaches were so aggressive and got the whole team with them, says
Jens Lindblom, father of 11-year old Agnes.
The girls cried while the sex abuse continued.
Klevius concluding comment: I've even written a PhD thesis about exactly this (including in depth interviews with Pia Sundhage and other important female football personalities from the 1940s and on). However. now I want to publish my findings for the general public but hesitate to do so due to the slim interest (or is it just deep ignorance) in this the biggest of global questions. Football/soccer is the sport that seems to best reveal the medieval thinking about sex segregation.
Any hints on how to make the book more popular than this blogging?
And why isn't the whole world reading Klevius?
Some previous reflexions on the topic:
The shameful contamination of British universities with religious fanatism
Guardian: The University of Leicester has launched an investigation into gender segregation (sic) at a public lecture held by its student Islamic society.
The talk, entitled Does God Exist?, featured a guest speaker Hamza Tzortzis as part of an Islamic Awareness week. Seating at the event was segregated, with different entrances into the lecture theatre for men and women. . .
In Leicester, more than 100 students attended the segregated event, which took place last month. A photograph passed to the Guardian shows signs put up in a university building, directing the segregation.
A message on the group’s website says: “In all our events, [the society] operate a strict policy of segregated seating between males and females.” The statement was removed after the Guardian contacted the society.
Klevius comment: Again this confused and irrational oxymoron 'gender segregation'. The sign on the wall of Leicester University clearly states 'males' and 'females'. It means biological sex, not cultural gender!
Rupert Sutton, from the campus watchdog Student Rights: There is a consistent use of segregation by student of islamic societies across the country. While this may be portrayed as voluntary by those who enforce it, the pressure put on female students to conform and obey these rules that encourage subjugation should not be underestimated.
Klevius: Although islam is by far the worst culprit when it comes to sex apartheid, there is also a consistent low level general use of sex segregation "light" across the world. While this may be portrayed as voluntary by those who enforce it, the pressure put on females (not the least by other females) to conform and obey to sex segregation that encourages subjugation should not be underestimated.
Leicester University is one of the world's most sexist (i.e. islamized) universities. You may not believe me but the truth is (an other professor witnessed it) that a female professor, Barbara Misztal (an East European immigrant? as BBC uses to put it), when presented with criticism against islam's rejection of women's full Human Rights via Sharia, said "Why don't you want to let women lead their lives as they wish". Yes, you got it right. She saw Sharia restrictions of women's rights as a right! Why hasn't anyone taught her that impositions are not rights, and that Human Rights don't hinder muslim women from choosing to live under these impositions whereas Sharia denies them the choice to freedom. Moreover, she also blamed the messenger for not allowing women to NOT HAVE THEIR FULL RIGHTS!
Barbara Misztal's female students need to know this, and as usual, it seems that Klevius is the only one daring to really address this ultimate and extremely disastrous and even dangerous sexism.
Sharia sex segregation or Human Rights for girls/women?Klevius 1979: Human Rights rather than religion
In every possible form of Sharia girls/women are forced to lead their lives in sex apartheid of varying degrees. And that includes OIC's all muslims covering Sharia law via UN. But according to Human Rights every girl/woman has the right to decide herself what kind of life she wants to lead - incl. a sex segregated life if she so wishes. So to live in a society where Sharia rules doesn't really give any fair options.
In islam women and non-muslims are all "infidels", and the only thing that really distinguishes a woman as muslim is her "duty" towards islam to reproduce (physically and/or culturally) as many new muslims as possible - and of course to have the Sharia duty to serve as a sex slave for her muslim husband.
Isn't that funny, muslims need a law to get sex while for me such compulsory sex equals rape!
Thursday, January 17, 2013
Judie Foster! Hello there! You don't have "to come out". You've been out all the time according to Human Rights!
Article 2 of the Universal Human Rights Declaration
- Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Klevius' explanation to those who can't read properly: In the non-islamic free world you can marry/cohabit or have friendship ties with anyone without having hetero-sex or sex at all! It's completely up to you as an individual.
Dear Jodie, for example, we don't expect hetero-couples "to come out" telling us they have never had sex, do we?!
Read more on What's sex segregation?
"The essence of her being ("the Woman") is sex, that she is a born prostitute, and that, on becoming older, she schemes to make young women follow the same path" (Otto Weininger some 100 years ago).
Klevius help for stupid readers: By "Woman" Weininger means the cultural construction, not the individual. Also remember that when Wittgenstein was criticized for having Weininger as one of his few idols he just pointed out that one could negate everything Weininger had written and still profit on him. And if you still feel confused please do ask for more help via comments.