The thoughts below were first presented 1979-81 in an article and
correspondence with Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's successor at
Cambridge), and later published in a book 1992, a letter to Francis
Crick (Salk) 1994, and on the web 2003.
Evolution means change - a fact missed by many neo-creationists*
* Exemplified with the eager
"humanifying" of Neandertals etc. extinct creatures. Or the equally
eager (not to say desperate) search for a hiding place where
"consciousness" can be protected against de-mystifiers such as e.g.
Peter Klevius.
In
Demand for Resources (1992 ISBN 9173288411) Klevius
crossed the boundaries between
consciousness-observation-understanding-language and wrapped it all in
one, i.e. adaptation.
According to Klevius analysis everything is
adaptation. There's no principal analytical difference between how
planets adapt to their star or how humans adapt to their environment.
And no dude, this is not "simplifying away" or diluting it. When the
bedrock of the Indo-Australian Plate met with the bedrock of the Asian
plate the landscape was almost flat. However, look at the Himalayas
today. Same rock but a completely different and extremely wrinkled
appearance and a new name, mountain range.
Consciousness is
neither simple nor complicated - and certainly not a "mystery". The real
mystery is how people "mystify" it - from Penrose's hiding in quantum
tubulars to Koch's escape into the brain's olfactory channels. The
former outside falsifiability, and the latter outside any kind of
scientific consensus and, more importantly, clearly related to the fact
that brain evolution started as a smell organ which later on was mounted
with additional gadgets (vision, hearing etc.) connected via Thalamus.
In short, as Klevius wrote 1992, this is why olfactory "memories" feel
so different. This is also why claustrum is focused towards the
olfactory lobes, i.e. functioning as a "translator" and transferer of
these signals which weren't originally connected to thalamus at all.
And
please, don't get stuck in the frontal lobe just because you find some
difference compared to other parts of the brain. The simple reason is
just that the frontal lobe happens to be the last expansion in brain
evolution and is lacking in non-humans.
The "mystery" of drivingness - or carness.
An undriving car doesn't move.
A selfdriving car makes
intentional decisions based on history and present. These decisions
wouldn't be any different with a human driver with exactly the same information
available. A surprising looking choice of route may be just based on
info npt available for the surprised.
Humans have humanness rather than "consciousness"*
* Humans have skin. So were's the mystery of "skinness"?
According to Peter Klevius (1981, 1992, 1994, 2003) humans have trapped
themselves in language and have a borderline problem re. what can be
said across the border between humans and "the rest".
In
Demand for Resources
(1992, ISBN 9173288411), Peter Klevius presented the following - his
own (as far as he is aware of) - original observations re. evolution and
awareness/mind:
Existence is change - not creation out of nothing.
Among
so called "primitive" societies which had had no contact with
monotheisms, the very thought that something could appear out of nothing
was impossible.
So why did monotheisms come up with such a ridiculous idea? It's
very simple. The racist "chosen people" supremacist ideology created a
"god" that was not part of the world he (yes, he) had created out of
nothing, i.e. making a clean sheet on which the chosen ones could exist
(see the chapter Existencecentrism in
Demand for Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411).
Culture is that (arbitrarily defined and bordered) part of adaptation that is shared by others.
Warning/advise:
To better your understanding of Klevius writings you need to realize
that he is extremely critical of how concepts are created and used. Not
in a stiff/absolute sense of meaning, but rather how concepts may
cluelessly (or deliberately) migrate within a particular discourse. So
when Dennet talks about "deliberate design" he contrasts it against
"clueless design", although such a distinction isn't possible. Evolution
is neither clueless nor deliberate. And whatever we are up to it can't
be distinguished from evolution other than as a purely human assessment -
in which case it can't include evolution. Only humans can evaluate
human behavior, which fact renders such evaluations pointless outside
the realm of humans. Getting this seems to constitute a main obstacle in
debates about AI and singularity.
This is why Klevius always
refers to the individual human's negative Human Rights, i.e. everyone we
agree is a human. This is also why Klevius can emphasize the Denisova
bracelet, genetics etc. finds in Siberia/Altai as proof of modern humans
evolving there (with some help from island South East Asia, not in
Africa. Most humans living today would have been incapable of
intellectually perform the task because the IQ peak has long since been
diluted in the mass of humans. We're all one family of humans but the
top of the line of human intelligence was a combination of island
shrinking brains and its genetic transfrer to big skulled relatives in
the north - as Klevius has pointed out since 2004 on the web.
Peter Klevius EMAH update on "consciousness" 2018:
Acknowledgement: I've never in my life met anyone who I've felt being more intelligent*
than I am. This means I've had no reason warshipping human intelligence.
And whole my life I've been told it's unfair that I see things faster
and clearer than others - or even worse, that I "turn black into white"
(some real idiots from the 1970-80s). But how could it be "unfair" when I
can't use it for my own advantage without others sooner or later
catching up and shaming me? And when you're in the front line no one
understands and therefore doesn't pay you. Which fact has added valuable
neutrality and reduced malign bias to/from Klevius' analysis.
*
Klevius intelligence was perhaps best described by the Finnish
neuroscientist, J. Juurmaa, who in the 1990s wrote: "Peter Kleviuksen
ajatuksen kulku on ilmavan lennokas ja samalla iskevän ytimekäs" which
translated to English would mean something like: "Peter Klevius' thought
process is easily eloquent yet simultaneously concisely punchy." This
he wrote in a long letter answering Klevius question about the effects
on the visual cortex on individuals who have been blind from birth. This
inquiry was part of Klevius check up of his already published EMAH
theory, so to get a qualified confirmation that the "visual cortex" in
born blinds is fully employed with other things than vision. Juurmaa's
description of Klevius is in line with philosopher Georg Henrik von
Wright's 1980 assessment, and more importantly with Klevius own
experience, and perhaps most importantly when assessing AI/deep learning
etc.
Only in true science and Human Rights does Klevius
intelligence matter. And with AI singularity "pure" science will be dead
anyway (although some idiots will never get it). Why? Because human
existencecentrism (look it up in Klevius 1992 book pp 21-22) will only
follow AI to the point of singularity.
Peter Klevius has - since
he at age 14 read Einstein's and Barnett's book - been fascinated with
human aversion of checking themselves in the mirror of
existencecentrism.
Future democracy will be cloud based and
filtered through (negative) Human Rights equality. This means that we
get rid of the distorting bottleneck our politicians now constitute.
This also means the definitive end of islam as we know it, i.e. as a
Human Rights violating excuse for racism, sexism, and power greed.
It's
astonishing how the avoidance of negative Human Rights affects every
debate. And most of this is due to our politicians' defense of the Saudi
dictator family. Why? Simply because they stand as the "guardians" of
islam and 1.6 Billion muslims which are all lumped together and
protected by the label "islamophobia" which in fact only protects the
Saudi dictator family and those who want to deal with it and its Human
Rights violating sharia(e.g. OIC etc).
There's no way to copy a
brain without a total break between individuals. That's perhaps one
definition of what it means to be a human.
What makes humans
individuals (atoms) and robots collective. Robot memories are shared and
if you destroy the hardware, the software will still be alive and well.
However, a human individual is extremely vulnerable to individual extinction.
And a "pet" copy is an other individual - although it remembers and behaves like the original.
Peter Klevius in Demand for Resources (1992:23, ISBN 9173288411):
The basis of existence is change, and causality constitutes a
complex of evolution and devolution. Evolution may be seen as the
consequence of causality's variables in time where complexity in
existing structures are reinforced. This stands in opposition to
thermodynamics which theoretically leads to maximal entropy (i.e.
energy equilibrium) where time/change finally ends. Someone might then
say that the products of evolution are just temporary components in
causality's road towards uniformity (Klevius 1981, 1992 - text copied
from Klevius 1981 article Demand for Resources).
The Even More Astonishing Hypothesis (EMAH)
by Peter Klevius
1991, years before Crick's book, the original idea was presented for
Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's own choice of successor at his
Cambridge chair), then published in Demand for Resources (1992, ISBN
9173288411), and 1994 presented for Francis Crick and 2004 presented on
the world wide web.
Abstract: Consciousness may be seen as
environmental adaptation rather than something "uniqely human". Although
neo-cortex constitutes the mass of adaptations Thalamus is the least
discussed yet perhaps the most important piece in the "puzzle of mind"
due to its central function as the main relay station between body
actions, brain and environment. A critical assessment of concepts such
as: observation/understanding, mind/body, free will, knowledge and
language reveals an inescapable awareness in the Thalamic "meet-puts".
In conclusion memories hence may be better described as associations
causing linguistic traps (i.e. self-inflicted "problems" produced in
language) rather than as distinct entities. The continuity model
proposed in EMAH avoids the limitations of a "discrete packets of
information" model, and without Cartesian dualism or the Homunculus
fallacy.
Note. In some respect the neural network of "lower"
systems such as the spinal cord and cerebellum by far outperforms the
cortex. This is because of different tasks (fast motorics and slow
adaptation) and due difference in processing. (Copyright Peter Klevius).
Introduction
Understanding
how social behavior and its maintenance in human and other forms of
life (incl. plants etc) evolved has nothing to do with “the balance
between self interest and co-operative behavior” but all to do with
kinship and friendship adaptation. Everything is "self-interest" - how
could it not be? Although humans may be attributed a more chaotic (i.e.
more incalculable) "personality", they are, like life in general, just
adaptive "robots" (i.e. active fighters against entropy – see Demand for
Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411). Misunderstanding (or plain ignorance
of – alternatively ideological avoidance of) kin recognition/friendship
(symbiosis), and AI (robotics) pave the way for the formulation of
unnecessary, not to say construed, problems which, in an extension, may
become problematic themselves precisely because they hinder an open
access for direct problem solving (see e.g. Angels of Antichrist –
kinship vs. social state).
Mentalists trap themselves in
selfinflicted astonishment over phenomenons they think are beyond
determinism. When Chomsky says "there are things beyond comprehension"
he should ask himself: Who are you to talk about things beyond
comprehension (compare 'existencecentrism' in Klevius Demand for
Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411), i.e. something that can't be asked -
without just pushing the border a little - or rather, just a new
comprehensible adaptation. And if it seems incomprehensible, it's no
more so than e.g. Donald Duck (see below).
The Future of a "Gap" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
Human:
What is a human being? Can the answer be found in a non-rational a
priori statement (compare e.g. the axiomatic Human Rights individual) or
in a logical analysis of the alleged "gap" between human beings and
others? The following analysis uses an "anti-gap" approach. It also
rests on the struggle and success of research performed in the field of
artificial intelligence (AI), automation/robotics etc.
Signal: A
"signal gap" is commonly understood as a break in the transition from
input to output, i.e., from perception to behavior. Mentalists use to
fill the gap with "mind" and "consciousness" while behaviorists don't
bother because they can't even see it. A five minute timelaps of Earth
spanning 4.5 Billion years would make a very lively planet. However,
where's "consiousness" between input (the single frames) and output (the
running video)? Or, what/whom should we allow to possess
"consciousness"? And if we limit it only to humans we are stuck with it
being just a human thing - hence impossible to use in general meaning.
An easier way out is to avoid the signal "gap" and call it what it is, a
network. But a network that continuously builds new patterns on top of
already existing ones.
Matter: Berkeley never believed in
matter. What you experience is what you get and the rest is in the hand
of "God" (i.e. uncertainty). This view makes him a super-determinist
without "real" matter. Klevius just adds the fact that Berkeley's "God"
is truly metaphysical and therefore not worthy of even talking about.
Mind:
The confusing mind-body debate originated in the Cartesian dualism,
which divides the world into two different substances, which, when put
together, are assumed to make the world intelligible. However, on the
contrary, they seem to have created a new problem based on this very
assumption. But a problem that has become popular among those who want
to talk metaphysics, i.e. giving an impression of talking about what
can't be talked about.
Free will: Following a mind-body world
view, many scholars prefer to regard human beings as intentional animals
fueled by free will. It is, however, a challenging task to defend such a
philosophical standpoint. Not even Martin Luther managed to do it, but
rather transferred free will to God despite loud protests from Erasmus.
Although Luther's thoughts in other respects have had a tremendous
influence on Western thinking, this particular angle of view has been
less emphasized. However, 'free will' can only be used locally.
Future:
When asked about the "really human" way of thinking, many mentalists
refer to our capacity to "calculate" the future. But is there really a
future out there? All concepts of the future seem trapped in the past.
We cannot actually talk about a certain date in the future as real
future. What we do talk about is, for example, just a date in a
calendar. Although it is a good guess that we are going to die, the
basis for this reasoning always lies in the past. The present hence is
the impenetrable mirror between the "real future" and ourselves.
Consequently, every our effort to approach this future brings us back in
history. Closest to future we seem to be when we live intensely in the
immediate present without even thinking about the future. As a
consequence the gap between sophisticated human planning and
"instinctual" animal behavior seems less obvious. Is primitive thinking
that primitive after all? And isn't 'instinct' just an excuse for
ignorance?
An additional aspect of future is that neither youth,
deep freezing or a pill against aging will do as insurance for surviving
tomorrow. The human individual is lost in a crash whereas the robot
brain safely hovers in the cloud - in many copies.
Observation and Understanding (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
If
one cannot observe something without understanding it, all our
experiences are illusions because of the eternal string of corrections
made by later experience. What seems to be true at a particular moment
may turn out to be something else in the next, and what we call
understanding is merely retrospection.
The conventional way of
grasping the connection between sensory input and behavioral output can
be described as observation, i.e. as sensory stimulation followed by
understanding. The understanding that it is a stone, for example,
follows the observation of a stone. This understanding might in turn
produce behavior such as verbal information. To do these simple tasks,
however, the observer has to be equipped with some kind of "knowledge,"
i.e., shared experience that makes him/her culturally competent to
"understand" and communicate. This understanding includes the cultural
heritage embedded in the very concept of a stone, i.e.it's a prerequsite
for observation. As a consequence it's not meaningful to separate
observation and understanding. This, of course, doesn't exclude "local"
(non-analytical) use of the terms in speech and literature etc. for the
purpose of catching subtle nyances.
Categorization belongs to the
language department, which, on the brain level, is only one among many
other behavioral reactions. But due to its capability to paraphrase
itself, it has the power to confuse our view on how we synchronize our
stock of experience. When we watch a stone, our understanding
synchronizes with the accumulated inputs associated with the concept of a
stone. "It must be a stone because it looks like a stone," we think. As
a result of such synchronization, our brain intends to continue on the
same path and perhaps do something more (with "intention"). For example,
we might think (as a result of our adaptation to the situation), "Let's
tell someone about it." The logical behavior that follows can be an
expression such as, "Hey look, it's a stone out there." Thus, what we
get in the end is a concept of a stone and, after a closer look, our
pattern of experience hidden in it. If the stone, when touched, turns
out to be made of paper maché, then the previous perception is not
deepened, but instead, switched to a completely new one.
It's
almost frightening how often one hears
researchers/scientists/philosophers etc. who think they are at least
average in intelligence, telling others that "previously we didn't
understand what X was", for example that "water consists of molecules
and atoms". This kind of schizophrenic "thinking" reflects the depth of
the mind/body hoax many are trapped in.
One might say that a
stone in a picture is a "real" stone, while the word 'stone' written on a
piece of paper is not. The gap here is not due to different
representations but rather to different contexts. When one tries to
equalize observation with understanding, the conventional view of
primitive and sophisticated thinking might be put in question. We still
act like complex worms, and sophistication is only a matter of biased
views built on different stocks of experience (adaptaion) and the
overwhelming complexity that appears chaotic. Moreover, a worm, just
like a computer, is more than the sum of its parts.
Therefore,
meaning, explanation and understanding are all descriptions of the same
basic principle of how we synchronize (adapt) perception with previous
experience. For the fetus or the newborn child, the inexperienced
(unsynchronized, or uncertainty/"god" if you prefer) part of the
inside-outside communication is huge compared to a grown up. Hence the
chaotic outside world (i.e., the lack of its patterns of meaningfulness)
has to be copied (adapted) in a stream of experience, little by little,
into the network couplings of the brain. When the neural pattern
matches the totality (meaningfulness) its information potential
disappears. Our brain doesn't store information - it kills information.
From an analytical point of view "storing of information" is an
oxymoron. On top of this, there is a continuous growth of new neurons,
which have to be connected to the network. As a result of these
processes, the outside world is, at least partly, synchronized with the
inside, "mental" world. Heureka, the baby appears to think and exist! In
other words, the baby records changes against a background of already
synchronized (adapted) inputs.
* see "existence-centrism" in
Demand for Resources (1992) for a discussion abt a shrinking god and the allmighty human!
The Category of the Uniquely Human Category Mistake (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
It's
meaningless to state that we are the best (or the worst) humankind.
However, category mistakes re. humans and non-humans are still common
and many researchers/scientists don't even seem to realize how
carelessly they handle this important distinction.
It's equally
meaningless to ask what something is that we don't know what 'it' is.
'Consciousness' is easily understood when used in comparison with
'unconcious'. However, how stupid is it when we mystify the term beyond
comprehension by squeezing in random additional properties and then ask
the question: What is this mystery with consciousness".
A main
difficulty in formulating the concept of consciousness is our pride
(presumably we should have been equally proud as mice) and our
tautological belief in "something uniquely human", However, if we try to
follow the die-hard determinists, we would find free will and destiny
easier to cope with, and also that the concept of "the unique human
being" is rather a question of point of view and carelessly crossing
borders of concepts.
Following this line of thought, I suggest
turning to old Berkeley as well as to Ryle but excluding Skinnerian
Utopias. Those who think the word determinism sounds rude and blunt can
try to adorn it with complexity to make it look more chaotic. Chaos here
means something you cannot overview no matter how deterministic it is.
We seem to like complexity just because we cannot follow the underlying
determinism. The same could be said about what it really is to be a
human? A passion for uncertainty, i.e. life itself. Francis Crick in The
Astonishing Hypothesis: "... your sense of personal identity and free
will are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve
cells and their associated molecules."
This statement is easy to
agree on, so let me continue with another, perhaps more useful, quote
from Crick: "Categories are not given to us as absolutes. They are human
inventions." I think these two statements create an efficient basis for
further investigations into the mystery of thinking. Hopefully you will
forgive me now as I'm going to abolish not only memory but also free
will and consciousness altogether. Then, I will go even one step further
to deny that there are any thoughts (pictures, representations, etc.)
at all in the cortex. At this point, many might agree, particularly
regarding the cortex of the author of this text.
The main problem
here is the storage of memories, with all their colors, smells,
feelings and sounds. Crick suggests the dividing of memory into three
parts: episodic, categorical and procedural. While that would be
semantically useful, I'm afraid it would act more like an obstacle in
the investigation of the brain, because it presupposes that the hardware
uses the same basis of classification and, like a virus, hence infects
our analyses.
The analysis presented here is the result of
de-categorization. The only thing that distinguishes us from the rest of
nature (and 'nature' includes all artefacts, non-human as well as human
ones) is the structure and complexity most (but not all) humans
possess. In other words, there's no point at which something "special"
happens. This is why Klevius in 1994 said that there's no principal
difference between a brick and his girlfriend - which comment rose the
eyebrow on his pal who admired Klevius girlfriend.
Instead of
categorization, this analysis sees only adaptation to the surrounding
world incl. one's own brain, which condtitutes of layers of previous
adaptations where the latest one is awareness, consciousness, or the
present now if you like.
Nerves, Loops and "Meet-puts" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
According
to Crick, "each thalamic area also receives massive connections from
the cortical areas to which it sends information. The exact purpose of
these back connections is not yet known." In the following paragraphs, I
will outline a hypothetical model in line with this question. The
interpretation of the interface between brain and its surrounding as it
is presented here has the same starting point as Crick's theory but
divides thinking into a relay/network system in the cortex and the
perception terminals (or their representatives in the thalamus) around
the body like an eternal kaleidoscope. Under this model, imagination
would be a back-projected pattern of nerve signals, associated to the
original events that caused them but with the signals faded and
localized as "internal" based on direction of nerve signals. This view
suggests that there are not only inputs and outputs but also whst one
might name "meet-puts," i.e., when an input signal goes through and
evolves into other signals in the cortex, these new signals meet other
input signals in the thalamus.
There is no limit to the possible
number of pattern/association in such a system, and there is no need for
memory storage but rather, adaptive network couplings. These
"couplings," or signal pathways, are constantly running in loops (not
all simultaneously but some at any given moment, i.e. e.g. what we call
awareness) from the nerve endings in our bodies through the network in
the cortex and back again to the thalamus. Of course the back-projected
signals have to be discriminated from incoming signals, thereby avoiding
confusion regarding fantasy and reality. But this process, though still
unknown, could be quite simple and perhaps detected simply based on the
direction where it comes from. As a consequence of the loops, the
back-projected pattern differs from the incoming signals, or the
stimuli. Therefore, every signal from the body/perceptions, hormonal
signals and so on, either finds its familiar old route or pattern of
association in the network (established/adapted experiences) or creates
new connections (new experiences) that can be of varying durability
depending on how they settle with older associations. For example, if
someone is blind from the moment of birth, s/he will have normal
neuronal activity in the cortex area of vision. On the other hand, in
case of an acquired blindness, the level of activity in the same area
will become significantly lower over time. This is logical according to
the EMAH model because, in the former case, the neurons have never
become involved in association patterns of vision but were engaged in
other tasks. In the latter case, the neurons have partly remained in
previous vision patterns, which are no longer in use, while the rest has
moved onto other new tasks.
It is important to note that human
thinking, contrary to what today's computers do, involves the
perceptions that originate from the chemical processes in the body's
hormonal system, what we carelessly name "emotions." This, I think, is
the main source behind the term "human behavior." The difference between
man and machine is a source of concern but, as I see it, there is no
point in making a "human machine". But perhaps someone might be
interested in building a "human-like machine".
Body vs. Environment - a History of Illusions (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
The surface of our body isn't the border of consciousness. A better candidate is the neuronal system/Thalamus.
According
to the EMAH model, nerves define our body. Thus, our hormonal signals
inside our body can be viewed as belonging to the environment
surrounding the nerveous system. As the meaning of life is to uphold
complexity by guarding the borders, it's ultimately a fight against
entropy. In this struggle, life is supported by a certain genetic
structure and metabolism, which synchronizes its dealings (adaptation)
with the surrounding environment. Balancing and neutralizing these
dealings is a job done by nerves. Also consider Klevius gut bacterias
with brain.
A major and crucial feature of this "body-guarding"
mechanism is knowing difference in the direction between incoming
signals and outgoing, processed signals. On top of this, both areas
change continuously and thus have to be matched against each other to
uphold or even improve the complexity. According to this model, people
suffering from schizophrenia, just like healthy people, have no problem
in discriminating between inputs and outputs. In fact, we can safely
assume that the way they sometimes experience hallucinations is just
like the way we experience nightmares. Both hallucinations and
nightmares seem so frightening because they are perceived as incoming
signals and confused as real perceptions. The problem for the
schizophrenic lies in a defect in processing due to abnormal functions
in and among the receptors on the neurons, which makes the association
pattern unstable and "creative" in a way that is completely different
compared with controlled fantasies. In the case of nightmares, the
confusion is related to low and fluctuating energy levels during sleep.
However, a frightful hallucination is always real because it is based on
perceptions. What makes it an illusion is when it is viewed
historically from a new point of view or experienced in a new "now,"
i.e., weighed and recorded as illusory from a standpoint that differs
from the original one. In conclusion, one may argue that what really
differentiates a frightful ghost from a harmless fantasy is that we know
the latter being created inside our body, whereas we feel unsure about
the former.
EMAH Computing as Matched Changes (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
EMAH
does not support the idea that information is conveyed over distance,
both in the peripheral and central nervous system, by the time of
occurrence of action potential?
"All we are hypothesizing is that
the activity in V1 does not directly enter awareness. What does enter
awareness, we believe, is some form of the neural activity in certain
higher visual areas, since they do project directly to prefrontal areas.
This seems well established for cortical areas in the fifth tier of the
visual hierarchy, such as MT and V4." (Crick & Koch, 1995a,b).
Hardware in a computer is, together with software (should be “a program”
because this word signals programming more directly), specified at the
outset. A high level of flexibility is made possible through the
hardware's ability to unceasingly customize to incoming signals. This is
partly what differs human beings from a machine. The rest of the
differentiating factors include our perceptions of body chemistry such
as hormones, etc. Programming a computer equipped with flexible
hardware, i.e., to make them function like neurons, will, according to
the EMAH-model, make the machine resemble the development of a fetus or
infant. The development of this machine depends on the type of input
terminals.
All input signals in the human, including emotional
ones, involve a feedback process that matches the incoming signals from
the environment with a changing copy of it in the form of
representations (or rather adaptations) in the brain's network
couplings. Life starts with a basic set of neurons, the connections of
which grow as experiences come flooding in. This complex body of
neuronal connections can be divided into permanent couplings, the sum of
experiences that is your "personality," and temporary couplings,
short-term more shallow "memories"/imprints for the time being.
A
certain relay connection, if activated, results in a back-projected
signal toward every receptor originally involved and thus creates, in
collaboration with millions of other signals, a "collage" that we often
call awareness. This is a constant flow and is in fact what we refer to
as the mysterious consciousness. At this stage, it is important to note
that every thought, fantasy or association is a mix of different kinds
of signals. You cannot, for example, think about a color alone because
it is always "in" or "on" something else (on a surface or embedded in
some kind of substance) and connected by relay couplings to other
perceptions or hormonal systems. "Meaning" is thus derived from a
complex mix of the loops between perceptions and back-projected
perceptions. This can be compared to a video camera system with a
receiving screen and a back-projecting screen. The light meter is the
"personality" and the aperture control the motor system. However, this
system lacks the complex network system found in the cortex and thus has
no possibility to "remember"/adapt. The recorded signal is of course
not equivalent to the brain's network couplings because it is fixed. To
save "bytes," our brains actually "forgets" what has been synchronized
(adapted) rather than "remember" it. Such changes in the brain - not
memories - are what build up our awareness. This process is in fact a
common technique in transmitting compressed data. It's also similar to
how we first actively learn to walk, and then stop thinking about it.
Short-Term Memories and Dreams (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
At
any given moment, incoming signals, or perceptions, have to be
understood through fitting and dissolving in a network of associations.
If there are new, incomprehensible signals, they become linked (coupled)
to the existing net and localized in the present pattern of
associations. Whether their couplings finally vanish or stay depends on
how they fit into the previous pattern and/or what happens next.
As
a consequence of this coupling process - a process that could be
described rather as a flow - memories in a conventional, semantic
meaning do not exist, because everything happens now. Consciousness or
awareness is something one cannot influence, but rather, something that
involves an ongoing flow of information to and from nerve endings
through the brain (a relay station incl. Thalamus). For every given
moment (now) there is consequently only one possible way of acting, i.e.
no absolute "free will". One cannot escape awareness or decisions
because whatever one thinks, it is based on the past and will rule the
future. Memories are thus similar to fantasies of the future, based on
and created by experiences. Regarding short-term memory, I agree with
Crick's view and hypothesis. But I certainly would not call it memory,
only weaker or vanishing superficial couplings between neurons. Remember
that with this model, the imagination of something or someone seen a
long time ago always has to be projected back on the ports were it came
through and thus enabling the appropriate association pattern. Although
signals in each individual nerve are all equal, the back-projected
pattern makes sense only as a combination of signals. The relay
couplings in the cortex is the "code," and the receptor system is the
"screen." Because this system does not allow any "escape" from the ever
changing "now" which determines the dealings with the surrounding
environment. Living creatures develope their software by living.
Dreams
are, according to this model, remnants of short-term memories from the
previous day(s), connected and mixed with relevant patterns of
associations but excluding a major part of finer association structures.
This is why dreams differ from conscious thinking. The lack of finer
association structures is due to low or irregular activity levels in the
brain during sleep. The results are "confused thoughts", which are
quite similar to those of demented people, whose finer neural structures
are damaged because of tissue death due to a lack of appropriate blood
flow. Thus dreams are relevantly structured but in no way a secret
message in the way psychoanalysts see them, whereas patients with
dementia tend to go back to their childhood due to the irrevocable
nature of the physical retardation process. Investigating dreams and
their meaning by interpreting them is essentially the same as labeling
them as psychological (in a psychoanalytical sense). A better and less
biased result would emerge if the researcher actually lived with the
subject the day before the dream occurred. Rather than analyzing pale
and almost vanished childhood experiences from a view trapped in
theoretical prejudices that describe an uncertain future, the researcher
should perhaps put more efforts in the logic of the presence.
Donald Duck and a Stone in the Holy Land of Language (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
Wittgenstein:
"Sie ist kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts!" (Phil. Untersuch.
304). Also see P. Klevius' analysis of a stone (in Demand for Resources -
on the right to be poor, 1992).
Although Wittgenstein describes
language as a tool it seems more appropriate to classify it as human
behavior. Unlike tools language is a set (family) of a certain kind of
bodily reactions (internal and/or towards its environment). We have to
reject, not only the grammar which tries to force itself on us", but
also, and perhaps even more so, representations we, without any
particular reason, assign to language.
Language is basically
vocal but apart from that, little has been said about its real
boundaries. One could actually argue that the best definition is perhaps
the view that language is human territory. The question whether animals
have a language is then consequently meaningless. On the other hand,
Wittgenstein denied the existence of a "private language" because
applying it could never prove the validity of its products. We are
trapped in words and connotations of language although these categories
themselves, like language in general, are completely arbitrary "language
games," as Wittgenstein would have put it. (no offense, Mr Chomsky and
others, but this is the tough reality for those trying to make sense of
it in the efforts of constructing intelligent, talking computers).
Furthermore, these categories change over time and within different
contexts with overlapping borders.
Changing language games
provide endless possibilities for creating new "language products", such
as e.g. psycho-dynamic psychology. I believe this is exactly what
Wittgenstein had in mind when he found Freud interesting as a player of
such games but with nothing to say about the scientific roots of the
mental phenomenon.
Let's imaging Donald Duck and a picture of a
stone. Like many psychological terms, Donald Duck is very real in his
symbolized form but nonetheless without any direct connection to the
reality of the stone. In this sense, even the word stone has no
connection to reality for those who don't speak English. Words and
languages are shared experience.
It is said that a crucial
feature of language is its ability to express past and future time. This
might be true but in no way makes language solely human. When bees
arrive to their hive they are able, in symbolic form, to express what
they have seen in the past so that other bees will "understand" what to
do in the future. Naming this an instinct just because bees have such an
uncomplicated brain does not justify a different classification to that
of human thinking.
If, as I proposed in Demand for Resources
(1992), we stop dividing our interaction with the surrounding world in
terms of observation and understanding (because there is no way of
separating them), we will find it easier to compare different human
societies. Language is a categorizing extension of perception/experience
patterns and discriminates us as human only in the sense that we have
different experiences.
Language has developed from a tool for
communication to an additional tool of deception within itself. In
Demand for Resources (1992 ISBN 9173288411) I used the example of a
stone that turned out to be papier mache, as well as the word existence
which has transformed from emerge to exist, i.e. loosing its root and
hence opening up for the question how we can exist.
However,
words and language are just like everything else that hits our
receptors. There is no principle difference in thinking through the use
of words or through sounds, smells (albeit not through thalamus),
pictures or other "categories". Ultimately, language is, like other
types of communication with the surrounding world, just a form of
adaptation to one's environment (in a broad sense of course), i.e.
resistance against entropy.
Wikipedia: Language is a
system that consists of the development, acquisition, maintenance and
use of complex systems of communication, particularly the human ability
to do so.
Human language has the properties of productivity and
displacement, and relies entirely on social convention and learning. Its
complex structure affords a much wider range of expressions than any
known system of animal communication. Writing is a medium of human
communication that represents language and emotion with signs and
symbols.
This short "definition" reveals the meaninglessness of the definition.
It's important to note the difference between everyday use of language, and language used about itself.
What's the difference between an image of a distant galaxy taken via a space telescope, or smell molecules left on a path?
And
long before humans realized how nature performs photosynthesis, they
already thought of themselves as the masters of Universe.
And
unlike what Chomsky and others say, Klevius doesn't think in language
other than when preparing to answer someone through language. Is this
why Klevius is a lousier talker than most early teenagers who don't have
a clue about what Klevius is talking about?
Words constitute
rigid traps when compared to free, smoothly running thinking/analysis -
unless you're gambling with words, as Freud did while waiting for
reality to catch up with his speculations we call psychoanalysis (see
Klevius Psychosocial Freud timeline.
However, words are also so unprecise that they are useless for
construction work etc. where we need math and geometry instead. Words
describe what it is and math how it is.
Everyday language needs
its greatest asset, volatility, which simultaneously constitutes its
main security risk re. faking/misleading communication.
To define
it more narrowly, language is also the room where psychoanalysis is
supposed to live and work. A stone does not belong to language, but the
word "stone" does. What is the difference? How does the word differ from
the symbolic expression of a "real" stone in front of you? Or if we put
it the other way round: What precisely makes it a stone? Nothing,
except for the symbolic value derived from the word "stone." The term
"observation" thus implicates an underlying "private language. When
Turing mixed up his collapsing bridges with math, he was corrected by
Wittgenstein, just as Freud was corrected when he tried to build
psychological courses of events on a fantasy of natural science.
Wittgenstein's "no" to Turing at the famous lecture at Cambridge hit
home the difference between games and reality.
Archetypes and
grammar as evolutionary tracks imprinted in our genes is a favorite
theme among certain scholars. But what about other skills? Can there
also be some hidden imprints that make driving or playing computer games
possible? And what about ice hockey, football, chess, talk shows, chats
and so on? The list can go on forever. Again, there is no
distinguishing border between evolutionary "imprints" (i.e. adaptation)
and other stimulus/response features in ordinary life.
"Primitive" vs. "Sophisticated" Thinking (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
The
more synchronized (informed) something or someone is with its
surrounding reality, the less dynamics/interest this something or
someone invests in its relationship with that particular reality.
Interest causes investment and social entropy excludes investment
economy because economy is always at war against entropy. The key to
economic success is luck and thus includes lack of knowledge. No matter
how well a business idea is outlined and performed, the success or lack
of success is ultimately unforeseeable.In Demand for Resources I
discussed the possibility of some serious prejudice hidden in Karl
Poppers' top achievement of civilization, namely the "World 3" and his
and Eccles' assumption of an increasing level of sophistication from the
primitive to the modern stage of development. It is of course easy to
be impressed by the sophistication of the artificial, technical
environment constructed by man, including language and literature, etc.
But there is nonetheless a striking lack of evidence in support of a
higher degree of complexity in the civilized human thinking than that of
e.g. Australian Aboriginals, say 25,000 years ago. Needless to say,
many hunting-gathering societies have been affluent in the way that they
have food, shelter and enough time to enrich World 3, but in reality
they have failed to do so.
Even on the level of physical
anthropology, human evolution gives no good, single answer to our
originality. What is "uniquely human" has rested on a "gap," which is
now closed, according to Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, among others.
This gap is presumably the same as the one between sensory input and
behavioral output mentioned above.From an anthropological point of view,
it can be said that a computer lacks genetic kinship, which, however,
is a rule without exception in the animate world, although we in the
West seem to have underestimated its real power.
De-constructing the Mind (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)
A
deconstruction of our underlying concepts of the brain can easily end
up in serious troubles due to the problem with language manipulation.
Wittgenstein would probably have suggested us to leave it as it is. If
language is a way of manipulating a certain area - language - then the
confusion will become even greater if we try to manipulate the
manipulation! But why not try to find out how suitable "the inner
environment" is for deconstruction? After all, this environment
presupposes some kind of biology at least in the border line between the
outside and the inside world. Are not behavioral reactions as well as
intra-bodily causes, e g hormones etc. highly dependent on presumed
biological "starting points"? How does skin color or sex hormones affect
our thinking? Where do causes and reactions start and isn't even the
question a kind of explanation and understanding?
Determinists
usually do not recognize the point of free will although they admit the
possible existence of freedom. Why? Obviously this needs some
Wittgensteinian cleaning of language. Unfortunately I'm not prepared for
the task, so let's pick up only the best looking parts, i.e. that words
as freedom, will, mind, etc., are semantic inventions and that they
have no connections to anything else if not proved by convincing and
understandable evidence. Does this sound familiar and maybe even boring?
Here comes the gap again. Stimuli and response seen purely as a
reflex/adaptation is not always correct, says G. H. von Wright, because
sometimes there may be a particular reason causing an action. According
to von Wright, an acoustic sensation, for example, is mental and
semantic and thus out of reach for the scientific understanding of the
body-mind interaction. Is this a view of a diplomatic gentleman eating
the cake and wanting to keep it too? To me, it is a deterministic
indeterminist's view.
G. H. von Wright concludes that what we
experience in our brain is the meaning of its behavioral effects. In
making such a conclusion that it is rather a question of two different
ways of narrowing one's view on living beings von Wright seems to narrow
himself to Spinoza's view. Is meaning meaningful or is it perhaps only
the interpreter's random projection of him/herself? Is it, in other
words, based only on the existence of the word meaning?
Aristotle
divided the world primarily into matter and definable reality (psyche).
As many other Greek philosophers, Aristotle was an individualist and
would have fitted quite well in the Western discourse of today.
Berkeley, who was a full-blood determinist, however recognized the
sameness in mind and matter and handed both over to "god". Consequently
Philonous' perceived sensations in the mind were not directly aligned
with Hylas view of immediate perceptions. We thus end up with Berkeley
as a spiritual die-hard determinist challenging materialistic humanism.
Conclusion
In
conclusion one might propose a rethinking of the conventional hierarchy
of the brain. What we use to call "higher levels", perhaps because they
are more pronounced in humans, are in fact only huge "neural mirrors"
for the real genius, thalamus (and its capability of two-way
communication with the cortex and extensions in the cerebellum, spine,
nerv ends etc), i.e. what is part of the "primitive" system. In other
words, one may propose a view describing the "gap" between humans and
animals as a quantitative difference in the amount/power of cerebral
"mirroring" and communication with thalamus, rather than as a distinct
qualitative feature. Nothing, except our "emotions", seems to hinder us
from making a "human machine". And because these very "emotions" are
lived experience (there is, for example, no way to scientifically
establish what could be considered "emotions" in a fetus) nothing,
except the meaninglessness in the project itself, could hinder us from
allowing a machine to "live" a "human life".
